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Abstract: This article gives an interpretative treatment of the historical 
record, from France taking possession of New Caledonia in 1853, through 
to the current Matignon process, assessing indications for coming develop-
ments. Focused on the debate over independence, it considers: interests of 
the French state as both arbitrator and participant in events; relations among 
the indigenous Melanesian Kanaks, European French Caldoches, and smaller 
ethnic communities; memories of colonial exploitation obstructing progress; 
the large nickel industry; immigration, and associated minority status of Kanak 
society—a central problem. It describes the alternation of left and right-wing 
parties in government in France, with Socialist Party governments commenc-
ing moves towards independence, possibly in association with France, and 
conservative governments moving to countermand those moves. It posits that 
the parties in New Caledonia have improved their chances of finding a positive 
outcome through jointly participating in government during 30 years of peace.
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Introduction
THE CONTEST continues in New Caledonia despite the pronounced major-ity against independence at the referendum on 4 November 2018. In that poll 141,099 French citizens resident in the territory decided on the ques-
tion: ‘Do you want New Caledonia to accede to full sovereignty and become 
independent?’ They voted ‘no’ by a margin of nearly 13 percent, yet that did not 
settle the burning issue of more than 60 years (RF, 2018). One reason is that the 
margin was considered close for a situation in which two large communities, 
the indigenous Kanaks and European French, needed an agreed, very clear and 
conclusive outcome.  Secondly the rules agreed to by the parties under the 1988 
Matignon process permit the Kanaks to obtain two further referendums on inde-
pendence in the coming four years. 
This article provides an interpretative review of the historical record, emphasising 
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as salient dates: 24 September 1853, when France took possession, and 8 May 1988, 
which marked the re-election of the French Socialist President François Mitterrand 
and the outset of the Matignon Accords.  It sets out to establish causes and effects 
of the present-day impasse, identifying contributing factors: conflict held over from 
a bitter colonial past; the Kanak movement leveraging indigeneity in its competi-
tion with the Caldoche settler society; the French state attempting to mediate while 
remaining a contestant for power, its policy on independence fluctuating with the 
alternation of left or right-wing governments in Paris—which might yet determine 
a final outcome; the great wealth generated by nickel, and problems linked with it, 
including immigration  where Kanaks have become a dissatisfied minority. A final 
section views prospects for change in the status quo as being very likely enhanced 
by the experience of 30 years’ peace and co-operation. 
Past abuses
A tragedy befell the Melanesian people, the Kanaks of today’s New Caledonia 
in 1853 with the proclamation of France’s possession of their land. On the cer-
emonial occasion, Le Fevre (2013, pp. 42-43) observes there had been no con-
sultation or assent, and chiefs in attendance were excluded from the formalities 
and signings, ‘apparently not even qualified to serve as witnesses’. 
Chappell (2003, p. 188) discounts European claims that colonisation brought 
peace, development and unity of society: 
In practice, French colonisation was one of the most extreme cases of na-
tive denigration, incarceration and dispossession in Oceania. A frontier of 
cattle ranches, convict camps, mines and coffee farms moved across the 
main island of Grande Terre, conquering indigenous resisters and confin-
ing them to reserves that amounted to less than ten percent of the land.
The policy was abetted by 19th century theories about race, which held that 
Melanesians were savages ‘incommensurably different’ to Europeans and be-
coming extinct (Le Fevre, 2013, p. 41, p. 305). The colonisers encountered 
violent resistance, most traumatically during the 1878 Grande Revolte led by 
the senior chief Attai (Fisher, 2013, p. 29; Le Fevre, 2013, p. 64). 
The drive for colonisation operated on several fronts: 
• Convict transportation began in 1864, adding 250 souls to 100 free set-
tlers. A total of 30,000 prisoners were transported until the abolition of 
the practice in 1897. 
• Free settler immigration was encouraged, engendering the intractable 
problem of the eventual outnumbering of the indigenous population. 
The 1887 code de l’indigenat, in force until 1946, enabled land confiscations 
outside the protections of metropolitan French law (Le Fevre, 2013, p. 64), 
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reducing reserves by 57 percent (Le Fevre, 2013, p. 68). Kanaks could not leave 
reserves without permission and did unpaid labour for public works. Fisher 
(2013, p. 30-31) provides figures indicating the effects of dislocation and psy-
chological derangement, disease and violent conflict on the Kanak population. 
This was estimated to be 45,000 in 1860, but reduced to 27,100 in the 1920s, 
recovering to some 30,000 in 1940 and close to 104000 in 2019. With increased 
immigration of Europeans, Polynesians from Wallis and Futuna and Asian la-
bourers from Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam, the approximate Kanak proportion 
of total population steadily dropped from close to 100 percent in 1850 to 68 
percent in 1887, 50 percent in 1956, 46 percent in 1969 and 39 percent by 2018.1 
Le Fevre (2013, p. 52) wrote about the ‘myth of Melanesian collective prop-
erty’ (quoting Merle, 1995), describing the ancient landscape, with each feature 
named, denoting pathways of ancestors, chefferies, related also to traditional 
hierarchies of entitlement. In this interpretation, that lay of the land and custom 
was misunderstood, or wilfully misconstrued by French officials as a simple 
ownership in common. There were arbitrary seizures and colonial authorities took 
it on themselves to prescribe certain lands for tribes, the tribus, as their reserves. 
The discovery of nickel in 1874 brought great wealth and opportunity to New 
Caledonia, with per capita Gross Domestic Product now close to Australia’s, but 
also brought major environmental, industrial and political problems, especially 
associated with more people being brought in and large-scale expansion.
The roots of present-day distrust—‘memories of injustice, exploitation and 
oppression which often remain strong in local tradition’ (Henningham, 1991, 
p. 28)—grew  out of 19th century colonialism. Confronted by aggressive and 
expropriative strangers the Kanaks struggled to resist through to the cultural 
awakening and impactful political mobilisations of the latter 20th century.
Shock of war and post-war reforms
The Kanak population fell to its smallest number around 1930. The French-
owned company Société Le Nickel generated more migration (Fisher, 2013, 
p. 29) and provided rich investment opportunities for settlers, notably the ‘fifty 
families’2 seen as a thriving local bourgeoisie, itself increasingly interested in 
self-government though always ‘within the Republic.’ As war loomed, Austral-
ian, British and New Zealand governments diverted exports of the strategic 
mineral away from Japan, installed military facilities in the South Pacific, in-
cluding Noumea, and assisted the Gaullist Free French to establish control.
New Caledonia’s occupation by up to 100,000 United States and New Zealand 
troops gave the same jolt and expansion as in Honiara, Port Vila or Townsville. 
The famous ‘casual generosity’ of the GIs, many black and independent enough 
to destroy ideas about genetic servitude, changed minds. Kanaks ‘experienced 
what it was like to be treated as relative human equals, to be paid fair wages for 
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work, and travel freely outside of a reservation’— with complaints from settlers 
about a new ‘arrogance’ among ‘natives’ (Le Fevre, 2013, p. 74-76).
New Caledonia shared in the global post-war decolonisation movement. A 
multi-racial reform party, the Union Caledonienne (UC) dominated the Territorial 
Assembly until after 1969; the code de l’indigenat went, and Kanaks had full 
French citizenship by 1958. French legislation under a leftist government, a loi-
cadre, allocated restricted powers to the colonial legislature. The UC supported 
by Kanaks and poor white or Asian workers, attempted reforms including the 
still-popular social security system, La Cafat (https://www.cafat.nc/). In reac-
tion, expatriate or settler groups rioted in Noumea in 1955 and 1958, demanding 
removal of the UC and there were bomb attacks in 1962 after France’s loss of 
Algeria (Chappell, 2003, p. 190).
Shock of recolonisation 
On his return to power in 1958, De Gaulle offered the French colonies inde-
pendence with no money from France, or incorporation in a greater French 
community. Confidence in the system was strong enough that enrolled New 
Caledonian voters opted for ‘France’ by 98 percent in the 1958 referendum 
(Fisher, 2013, p. 50). France then imposed a systematic recolonisation (Chap-
pell, 2003, p. 188), commencing a contest between right and left-wing inten-
tions for New Caledonia through to this day. Chappell (2003, p. 190) docu-
ments the Gaullist High Commissioner, Laurent Pechoux, removing powers of 
the elected colonial government—initially control of the civil service, police 
and radio station. The 1963 constitutional law, loi Jacquinot (Chappell, 2003, 
p. 191; Fisher, 2013, p. 56), abolished the positions of colonial Ministers and 
relegated the legislature to consultative status only. 
The immediate reasons for this policy, which predictably caused bitter, long-
term resistance, were that the French government was determined to conduct 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific, following the loss of testing ranges in Algeria 
and would not ‘give a megaphone’ to possible opponents (Steinmetz in Frediere, 
2018; Duffield, 2018). Such testing by the Americans and British had already 
drawn strong opposition (Henningham, 1991, p. 40; Maclellan, 2017; Duffield 
2018a). The Gaullist project fitted traditional colonial policy: France could 
recover glory as an independent nuclear power, demonstrating global influence 
through its overseas dependencies. French nationals looking to gain fortunes or 
perform good works would be protected (Le Fevre, 2013, p. 18; Fisher, 2013, 
p. 85). Economic growth brought some share of advantages to all; missionaries, 
including many who strove to help indigenes, received validation through the 
continuing existence of large Christian congregations. 
Nickel production virtually tripled from 1967 to 1971 (Fisher, 2013: 57), with 
the immigrant population increasing by 20 percent. As 2000 Algerian pied noirs 
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re-settled in New Caledonia, Chappell (2003, p. 199) notes that ‘attitudes’ also 
arrived; former colonials could bring resentments and rejection of multi-cultural 
ideas. Migrants received special agency assistance and Prime Minister Pierre 
Messmer wrote his famous 1972 memorandum declaring that indigenous nation-
alism should be neutralised by creating a non-indigenous majority, through ‘an 
operation of overseas colonisation’ (Chappell, 2003, p. 191; Fisher, 2013, p. 56). 
‘Breed whites,’ said the Noumea Mayor Roger Laroque (Chappell, 2003, p. 191). 
France and instability in the Pacific region
French governments seeking to uphold France’s strategic, political, cultural and 
economic prominence (Henningham, 1991, pp. 21-23) became a source of in-
stability in the South Pacific after 1960. The inter-governmental Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, supporting and including the Kanaks, obtained re-inscription 
of France by the United Nations Decolonisation Committee. That diplomatic 
check exhibited the phenomenon of newly independent states pursuing their 
own interests. It reflected extensive conflict over the nuclear tests which con-
tinued until 1996 and aggravated relations with Australia and New Zealand. 
Matters worsened after the bombing of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior 
on 10 July 1985 in Auckland, an enactment of the ‘deep state’ that no French 
government would completely disown, delivering only very recalcitrant apolo-
gies over time. The sour exit of the French from Vanuatu also drew opprobrium 
(Fisher, 2013, pp. 53-55; Le Fevre, 2013, p. 5). Relations recovered after 1988, 
notably after the end of nuclear tests in 1996. 
Protest and the Évènements
The year 1969 saw the bitter realisation by Melanesians that they had lost 
majority status in the general population, ascribing it to a deliberate manipu-
lation of numbers (Henningham, 1991, p. 122), a moment seen by Chappell 
(2003:200) as a turning point for Kanak awakening: ‘The outnumbered Kanak 
now had to assert their indigeneity as leverage, but calls for Kanak independ-
ence—tied to socialism—polarised politics and ethnic relations.’ A positive 
sense of Kanak solidarity had been generated by the cultural revival movement 
under the inspired leadership of Jean-Marie Tjibaou, but now resistance and 
response would bring the territory close to civil war. 
Returning youth leaders who had experienced the Paris May revolution, like 
Nidoish Naisseline from a chiefly family in the Loyalty Islands, ran into hard-
line suppression of their protests (Chappell, 2003, pp. 193-97). Kanak groups 
began a decade of direct action: civil disobedience, hunger strikes, circulating 
tracts, challenging colour bars at chic restaurants or hotels and pervasive graf-
fiti (Chappell, 2003, p. 198). Some made contact with revolutionary regimes in 
Cuba or Libya.
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This change ended the liberal period that had seen gradual progress towards 
independence. The multi-cultural UC lost most of its non-indigenous membership 
and support to the conservative party, Le Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans 
la France (RPCR), headed by Jacques Lafleur, which won the 1977 territorial 
elections. 
Most white Caledonians and other immigrants, fearing exclusion, fled 
towards the right, and loyalists were already manipulating dependent 
Tahitians and Wallissians into violent action against pro-independence 
Kanak (Chappell, 2003, p. 200). 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou’s independentist front briefly came into office in 1982 with 
support from a break-away group from the loyalist majority, his accession once 
again provoking violent actions by right-wing gangs. Hope of a turn-around 
arose with the election of the Socialist Party President François Mitterrand in 
1981 (Chappell, 2003, p. 200), but rising conflict obstructed dialogue. 
Armed clashes called les Évènements started in 1984 in a setting of ‘almost 
intolerable tension and violence’ (Fisher, p. 61). In September the Kanak politi-
cal groups formed the socialist united front, the Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), declaring plans for a government in exile, flying 
the new Kanaky flag and calling a boycott on elections set for November 18. 
The Évènements are seen as having started with the smashing of a ballot box 
by the activist Éloi Machoro on election day (Fisher, 2013, p. 61). One month 
later, he organised the occupation of a large land-holding where he was killed 
by a police sniper. Kanaks had burned down polling stations and erected road-
blocks, where fatal exchanges took place with anti-independentists, including 
the ambush killing of two brothers of Tjibaou with eight other Kanaks (Fisher, 
2013, p. 61). Clashes went on for more than two years.  
Architecture of a peace
From the 1950s, French Socialist Party governments concentrated on building 
relationships and constructing a deal that might enable a peaceful independ-
ence, usually in a form of association with France. They produced structures 
and principles ultimately followed in the Matignon process. Conservative gov-
ernments, under De Gaulle and later Chirac, would stop the process and undo 
the work done. Their local affiliates participated in negotiations when they were 
happening, but also waited for opportunities to set things back.
Socialist Party initiatives for settlement
The 1956 loi-cadre (under Overseas Territories Minister Gaston Defferre) 
transferred certain powers to elected assemblies, enabling the UC’s experi-
ment in multicultural government. While mostly rescinded during the Gaullist 
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recolonisation, it did foreshadow the current allocation of all but five key pow-
ers to the territorial legislature (defence, foreign affairs, justice, law and order, 
and currency). Eventual transfer of those powers now defines the independence 
debate. 
In July 1983, the Minister, Georges Lemoine, convened all parties in France, 
proposing the 1984 elections ahead of a five-year lead-up to a vote on inde-
pendence. It anticipated the Matignon formula, delay before a referendum and 
mutual recognition contained in the Matignon accords. Kanaks would receive 
acknowledgement of an ‘innate and active right to independence,’ and would 
accept all New Caledonians taking part in the decision-making (Fisher, 2013, 
p. 60). Also anticipating Matignon, the agreement foundered on disagreements 
over the electoral list, Kanaks demanding stiff residential voter qualifications to 
off-set their minority status.
The August 1985 Fabius-Pisani law, made as the Socialist Party faced defeat 
in the forthcoming French elections, offered independence in association with 
France under Article 88 of the French Constitution, an untried device for affili-
ation of a partner state. A similar proposal is under discussion in 2019. The plan 
delineated three provinces where Kanak and Caldoche parties could respectively 
govern and exercise substantial powers, in effect a power-sharing arrangement 
carried into the later accords. It envisaged a vote the following year by residents 
with three years standing, on a limited independence, with France retaining central 
powers like defence and security. The three-year rule would become an ongoing 
sticking point (Fisher, 2013, p. 60; Chappell, 2003, p. 200). 
Shock of the Chirac premiership 1986-88 and deaths on Ouvéa Island
The notoriously combative conservative French politician Jacques Chirac was 
Prime Minister from 1986-88, during which time he attempted an immediate 
closing down on independence for New Caledonia. Concurrently campaigning 
for election as President of France in 1988 and working with the French-loyalist 
RPCR, he set up the referendum on independence in 1987, open to three-year 
residents. The poll was boycotted by Kanaks, produced a 98.3 percent ‘no’ on 
a 59 percent turn-out of registered electors. A second statute initiated moves to-
wards removing Kanak citizens’ Customary legal status which provided prefer-
ential access to joint acquisitions of reserve land (Bernigaud in Duffield, 2018). 
A garrison of 6,000 troops fanned out among the Kanak villages, to keep order 
and eventually help with development projects, but this exacerbated dissent. 
Chirac’s disruption of the evolving search for a settlement abruptly ended with 
the hostage-taking crisis and military action on Ouvéa Island, in which six police 
and 19 Kanak fighters were killed. Both Mitterrand and Chirac had approved the 
armed response to free the hostages, on 5 May 1988, between the two voting rounds 
in their election. Mitterrand won and called a general election which returned his 
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Socialists to power. Exhausted political leaders were anxious to talk once the in-
coming Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, could get proceedings underway. 
The Matignon and Noumea Accords
The conference at the Matignon Palace was acclaimed as deft statecraft which 
brought Lafleur and Tjibaou together after five years. The agreement and the 
supporting Oudinot pact, drew on the principles established in previous at-
tempts, under Defferre, Lemoine and Fabius-Pisani. It committed both sides 
to respecting the right of the other to live in New Caledonia (Bernigaud in 
Duffield, 2018). There would be a referendum for independence after a decade.
Recognising Kanak anxieties about population, a separate electoral roll for 
territory voting would use long-term residency: those enrolled in 1988 could vote 
in 1998.  The three provinces plan would continue, giving Caldoche interests in 
the South based on Noumea and giving Kanak leaders formal power in the North 
province and Loyalty Islands, including significant options for engagement in 
the nickel industry. The provinces selected members for a legislative Congress, 
which emerged with a small anti-independentist majority. France would fund an 
ambitious economic development programme in Kanak-held areas and expanded 
education and training. The Accord was signed in Paris on 21 August 1988, ap-
proved in a national referendum by 80 percent, on a 37 percent voter turnout. 
The Matignon Accord did not obliterate tensions and unresolved conflicts. 
Where the Évènements had dissuaded immigration, the new era brought minerals 
expansion and revived it. Tjibaou and his deputy, Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, were assas-
sinated in 1989 by a follower claiming they had conceded too much. LaFleur 
died in 2010. Part of the agreement had been that the French government would 
buy his shareholding in the nickel company Société Minière du Sud Pacifique 
for the Northern province—valued at US$21.25 million in 1990 (Fisher, 2013, 
p. 67). The arrangement demonstrated much about the strategic importance of 
nickel, the actual great wealth of holdings and power among the Caldoche elite, 
its entrenched position in the institutions as well as a sense of social responsi-
bility and disparities of wealth and opportunity which the transfer to the Kanak 
dominated province was meant to help alleviate.
The successor agreement, the 1998 Noumea Accord was brokered by yet 
another Socialist premier, Lionel Jospin, and approved by a referendum in New 
Caledonia by 72 percent with 74 percent of eligible voters taking part. It ex-
tended the time limit for the independence referendum by another 20 years. As 
part of economic rebalancing, it dealt extensively with the allocation of nickel 
resources geographically and among companies and institutions, including 
provincial governments, producing an accompanying industry agreement, the 
Bercy accord. The referendum plan contained a safety valve feature whereby if 
the first vote was ‘no’ (as it was) there was provision for two more referenda in 
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2020 and 2022.  The French state began handing over all government powers 
save the ‘five.’ Under terms of a new Organic law, New Caledonia received the 
status of an associated country able to enact separate legislation, lois du pays, 
overseen by France’s Constitutional Council not its government. It affirmed use 
of a separate electoral list recognising ancestral or long-term residency (Fisher, 
2013, pp. 69-71; Robertson, 2018). Some excluded residents have unsuccessfully 
appealed to international tribunals or the United Nations. 
Commentaries and the Lendemain—prospects for the future 
The Macron government convened new Paris negotiations late in 2017 to set in 
motion the November 2018 referendum. The 20 years’ interregnum since the 
Matignon talks produced peaceful, but insecure, political relations. Two broad, 
opposing camps made a loose orthodoxy: Kanak, independentist, poorer, left 
wing versus European, anti-independence, richer and right wing. Both sides 
had divisions, the anti-independentists in particular forming new parties, like 
Caledonie Ensemble, still loyalist, but determinedly multi-racial—taking most 
of the RPCR support base. Collaboration in government under the Accord with 
Ministers coming from both the majority and minority had bolstered civility. 
Political violence and racialist outbursts subsided markedly. 
Yet both sides became stubborn when debating the dangerous question of 
who could vote. It was agreed that those on the 1988 rolls and their descendants 
would qualify, with other conditions available to confirm enrolment, such as 
long-term residency tests or votes for Kanaks living abroad. The insistence on 
beginning at 1988, already excluding many residents of 14 or more years’ stand-
ing, is bound to become less sustainable as time progresses.  Anti-independentists 
unsuccessfully appealed to a constitutional court against the 1988-plus-10-years 
rule, citing wording in the Accord that might have moved the residency cut-off 
date from 1998 to 2004 (Fisher, 2013, pp. 101-102). 
Kanak demands that all citizens with custom status should automatically be 
enrolled, and enrolment procedures simplified, ended in compromise. With 25,000 
Kanaks missing from the special roll, 11,000 were automatically inscribed from 
the general, French national roll (Robertson, 2018). A United Nations monitoring 
commission criticised the ‘unreliable’ state of files and poor communication with 
electors by local government offices managing the poll, specifically at Noumea 
and Dumbea, strongly anti-independence areas (UN, 2018). The rolls require 
work and will cause more disputes. 
Nickel industry
New Caledonia is renowned as the world’s fifth largest producer, pushing ahead 
with new mines and processing facilities. Nickel provides 80 percent of terri-
tory export earnings. Fisher (2013, p. 129) noted  some of the difficulties that 
could arise from large-scale engineering and mining works:
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Even one major nickel plant in an island economy is a massive undertak-
ing, involving billions of dollars, complex technological and metallurgical 
challenges, labour concerns, social and environmental factors… Even for 
the French State, the projects are enormous … Added to that is the fact that 
the relatively inexperienced New Caledonian Government, and provincial 
administrations, under their new-found powers from the 1998 Noumea 
Accord, are tackling these large projects in their first years of existence, 
while developing legislative frameworks along the way.
Complex ownership and financing arrangements add to conflicts over environ-
mentally damaging strip-mining projects, with seven main mines now in long-
term production or coming into operation. The Kanak parties have a major 
political stake in the local public sector company Société Territoriale Calédo- 
nienne de Participation Industrielle (STPCI), which acquired 30 percent of 
SLN under the Accords. They want revenue to tackle poor housing, employ-
ment, public education and general health. Commercial interests from Aus-
tralia, Canada and Japan have large holdings, but French interests dominate, 
predominantly the state-owned Eramet corporation.   
Interests of the French state
The French state in its awkward position as arbiter, stake-holder and participant 
in the politics of New Caledonia and enforcer of law and order would much 
prefer to stay there. The national government continues to commit more than 
US$1.435-billion annually to New Caledonia (Fisher, 2013, p. 125; Henning-
ham, 1991, p. 22) while insisting (Girardin in LNC, 2019) that any outcomes 
will respect an abstract local ‘public interest’. It retains substantial control in 
the disputed policy areas of immigration and the nickel industry, where French 
law may take precedence, for example as retained external powers, or a duty to 
keep strategic reserves (Chappell, 2003, p. 191), or where the Accords are silent 
or found to be ambiguous.
It operates a large military command from Noumea, seeing national interest 
in its role as a guarantor of security in the South Pacific and Western ally—a 
strategic bulwark to keep out prospective new entrants like China. The military 
space programme is taking over from nuclear testing. The tradition of protect-
ing French citizens remains strong. There are 278,000 in New Caledonia, up to 
one-third from metropolitan France. Adding to the wealth produced by nickel 
is the windfall of the huge, expanded  Exclusive Economic Zone acquired by 
France, through its overseas territories, under the 1982 United Nations Law of 
the Sea Convention (https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-
largest-exclusive-economic-zones.html). A large section extending West from 
Grande Terre contains hydrocarbons, not yet thoroughly surveyed. The Accords 
allocate prime control to New Caledonia, but leave space for interpretation over 
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the use of EEZ resources (Fisher, 2013, pp. 125-6; Henningham 1991, p. 22). 
Interest in New Caledonia in metropolitan France may be sluggish, as with the 
low voter turnout in 1988 (Duffield, 2018b), but might readily be activated as in 
the past by any return to violence, or a perceived abandonment of rich natural 
wealth to a potentially weak and fickle independent state. 
Public servants—valuable resources and subject of discord   
Use of European French functionaries remains important to effective govern-
ance, but is taking up prime jobs and adding to the population imbalance. Inde-
pendentists must continue trusting the professional detachment of, for example, 
those working for the Kanak-dominated Northern province government. Simi-
larly, nickel has brought in highly-skilled staff. Whatever the political impacts 
of immigration, the skills and technology transfer are widely promoted as es-
sential, at least until Kanak personnel can be brought up through education and 
training schemes. Those are provided especially under the Accords, but meas-
ures of school performance and outcomes of training programmes have lagged 
and change will require time (Fisher, 2013, pp. 141-43). 
The armed forces, police and paramilitary Gendarmerie make up a large 
‘French’ presence with unfortunate histories of conflict, mainly with Kanaks. 
Since the Rainbow Warrior bombing (Robie, 2005) and the New Caledonia 
Évènements (see Robie, 1989—a comprehensive chronicle including investiga-
tive sections also on the fate of the Greenpeace ship), questions will be raised 
about the quality and discipline of these forces, and their control under a new 
government. The police presence remains widely valued and is considered es-
sential, though with reservations about the numbers fielded to meet possible 
disturbances, as during the 2018 referendum. Tension exists in districts prone 
to violent disturbances where police will maintain check-points. 
An indicative factor in the debate over immigration, population and inde-
pendence is the presence in New Caledonia of more than 6000 retired French 
civil servants drawing premiums up to 175 percent on already substantial pen-
sions, which are available to state retirees after service anywhere in France or its 
dependencies if they go to live in an overseas territory. This scheme to boost the 
numbers of an educated European population is expensive and will be phased 
out from 2027 (Fisher, pp. 117-19). Such premiums are not available to New 
Caledonia government employees and Kanak representatives propose cancelling 
them after independence (Duffield, 2018c).  
Social relations and electoral politics—what future?
Consensus can be imagined around the notion of an independence in association 
with France, though independentists will want the five residual powers always as-
sumed to be on offer in the 2018 referendum. They proposed the inclusion of the 
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qualifying expression ‘full sovereignty’ with the connotative, near-absolute ‘in-
dependent’ in the referendum question (Dayant, 2018). That is an instance of the 
Kanak leadership’s focused political intent, a level of sophistication doubted as 
opinion polls suggested a much bigger ‘no’ vote in 2018. The result indicated a 
more viable contest. It undermined the attempted knock-out blow against inde-
pendence by the RPCR under Pierre Frogier, who asked the French government 
to scrap further referenda as foregone conclusions, a request the government 
refused (Frédière & Poisson, 2018). The voting proved the Kanak organisation 
could produce a big indigenous vote strongly for ‘yes’ with significant support 
beyond the Kanak population. It signalled that a community-based ‘get-out-
the-vote’ campaign would reliably deliver big numbers with scope for a second 
type of operation to extend the movement’s appeal into a wider community.
Much will depend on the Kanak assessment of their position and any chances 
to get an additional net seven-percent, and reverse the 2018 referendum result, 
by 2022. Demands for electoral reform might see more Kanaks enrolled, but 
not enough to succeed if such calls are confined to a single minority community. 
Independence strategists might consider census data which in recent years has 
included growing numbers of people who might be approached for support, that 
is, those who describe themselves as neither Kanak nor European, but as New 
Caledonian, mixed race, undisclosed or other. It might be false encouragement, as 
the Kanak share of the population continues to decline in the face of immigration. 
Many of those who identify themselves as ‘mixed race’ are likely to be Walli-
sians, who make up nearly nine percent of the population and are not allied with 
the Kanaks. Additional categories would also contain more Europeans (Fisher 
2013, pp.109-111, 117).  However it might also indicate a possible reservoir of 
residual support, from individuals and small groups, including younger voters 
normally more sympathetic towards independence. 
The FLNKS and associated bodies face a choice: to continue with the aspira-
tion of a pre-1853 Kanaky, basing their power on cultural and ethnic-nationalist 
solidarity; or to build on the two-part offering, independence and full sovereignty 
in association, which might attract many non-Kanaks. The new state might be a 
Kanaky headed by Kanaks instead of by French Europeans, but in full associa-
tion with the demanding modern world. Taking such a product to prospective 
new voters would mean venturing further into the Western system of campaign 
politicking which so far has been more the preserve of the anti-independentist 
camp. The Caldoche parties also may campaign to get additional support from 
demographic niches, though the figures suggest that hopes of a mass cross-over 
of Kanaks voting ‘no’ had no substance.
An important option for change would be to resolve the political deadlock 
between the Kanak population and the Caldoches. The participation of both 
sides in making an electoral list that excluded ‘newcomers’ implied some form 
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of common interest or, however reluctantly, mutual recognition. Locally born 
Europeans make up perhaps 10 percent of total population (Fisher, 2013, p. 31, 
p. 109). Caldoche parties have co-operated with Kanaks in government, but have 
also taken part in unsuccessful moves to obtain a one sided settlement from a 
succession of  French governments. These have included Laflueur’s consorting 
with Chirac on the 1987 referendum, his moves to head-off a referendum in 1998 
(Fisher, 2013, p. 69) and Frogier’s bid to prevent referenda in 2020 or 2022. 
The common ground is further fractured by the long-term memory of colonial 
exploitation such as the code de l’indigenat.
Resident Europeans are able to provide business and professional experi-
ence and knowledge of modern statecraft or law essential to maintaining the 
islands’ economy – although those could be expatriates rather than permanently 
ensconced Caldoches. A Kanak response is that this is part of a level exchange, as 
expressed by Andre Qaeze Ihnim, speaking for the FLNKS: ‘We have provided 
the country, the land. French people have brought technology and expertise, and 
we must cooperate’ (Duffield, 2018). The practice of French law that endorses 
customary rights of Kanaks to land should help arguments that ownership inheres 
in original occupation of the islands (Berginaud in Duffield, 2018). 
The Kanak movement interprets the Accords process as a preparation for 
independence. It is concerned that continuing with the status quo could bring 
lasting alienation of a large proportion of the populace. Andre Qaeze Ihnim pre-
sents the overall Kanak position as being adamant on achieving independence 
and refusing to concede the country or become ‘extinct’. (Chappell, 2003, p. 
122). With sporadic disturbances even after the electoral calm of 2018 (Duffield, 
2018d), there is a drive to prevent a revival of violence: 
We talk to our young people. Some people say we want the French to go 
home, and we ask them, if you would do it like that, then what would you 
do? They are not angry for nothing, they may give expression to anger in 
their hearts and are always asked what would they do otherwise. (Duffield, 
2018c) 
He avers that indépendentists have demonstrated a will to achieve their objec-
tives through productive dialogue:
We have been following the route laid out when our leaders signed the 
documents in 1988, as a kind of guideline to go on to sovereignty and 
independence. We recognised the differences between ideology and reality, 
and have spent 30 years getting experience in managing the country—and 
showing that now we are ready. That is our understanding of what our 
leaders signed on to. We would want to manage through consultation and 
a kind of negotiation, and would say (to the French), if you want to stay 
in the country, for it to be managed like this, then come and stay … We 
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are not against them. We just ask that now we can … share and manage 
it together (Duffield, 2018). 
That resolution on finding future accord is echoed on all sides, including French 
President Emmanuel Macron who said: ‘The only way to go now is through di-
alogue.’ (Duffield, 2018d). There have been ameliorating gestures like the sup-
port from Frogier for flying the two flags together; or from the anti-independ-
entist, former President of New Caledonia Philippe Gomès, who said: ‘When 
there was no dialogue there was violence; when there was dialogue it enabled 
keeping the peace (Duffield, 2018c).’ 
The prospectus bodes for a certain reversal of status common in the history 
of decolonisation generally. Caldoche interests would benefit from and might 
always feel the need for full legitimacy in the country if wanting to continue 
there and in positions of leadership. The Kanak population has an indelible 
status of original ownership, deep and continuous cultural tradition in place, 
their ancient chefferies marking out the land, and the fact of never having sur-
rendered sovereignty. Settlers, unless hailing from some privileged lineage in 
France, might base a claim on forebears arriving in the 19th century, not always 
something to be proud of in the present era. Noting the adage of sociology that a 
status is achieved when the aspirant is accepted by holders of that elusive status, 
it is ultimately for Kanaks to finally make Calédoniennes of the Caldoches. It 
is theirs to confer, perhaps by far their strongest hand in coming encounters.
New Caledonia has almost arrived at the lendemain, the day after the final 
vote. The November 2018 referendum demonstrated the existence of a relatively 
even divide within the society, and another referendum is to be scheduled under 
law for two years’ time. The situation on the ground is characterised by the exist-
ence of the two main communities, Kanak and French, in an uneasy intentional 
harmony, but there are also indications of the possibility of an as-yet uncharted 
multi-culturalism. 
Other facts to consider include the high stakes element of the rich economy 
based on nickel and prospective additional resources under the sea; immigra-
tion, especially when linked to the nickel industry which has been weakening 
the position of the indigenous Kanaks; and the traditional strategic interest of 
the French state in maintaining its foothold in the South Pacific. That interest 
contradicts, complicates, and renders suspect the role of France as a broker in the 
independence debate. History has found New Caledonia’s future  being deter-
mined by alternating left-wing and right-wing French governments, the former 
interested in organising pathways to independence, the latter often trying to stop 
the process.  Relationships among all these interests continue unresolved, but 
the peaceful interregnum since the Matignon Accord was signed in 1988, and 
the will for dialogue, are a positive omen for the future. 
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Notes
1. A break-down of community numbers in the New Caledonia population drawing on 
census figures is given in Fisher, 2013, p. 107
2. Influential families including Ballande, Barrau, Bernheim, Higginson, Marchand, 
Lafleur, Pentecost (Fisher, 2013, p. 29) 
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